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Dienstag, 19. Juni 2012

Spain is Now Facing a Banking Crisis and a Sovereign Crisis At the Same Time

Spain is Now Facing a Banking Crisis and a Sovereign Crisis At the Same Time

Phoenix Capital Research's picture

Last year I wrote a piece in which I noted that the EU would implode before the end of 2012. The reason for this was clear as day: EU banks needed to roll over hundreds of billions of Euros’ worth of debt (possibly trillions) at a time when interest rates would be rising as sovereign bonds fell in value:

At that time I wrote:

This is not a question of “if,” it is a question of “when.” And it will very likely happen within the next 10-12 months if not sooner depending on how soon Greece defaults.

The reason that this is guaranteed to happen before the end of 2012 is that a HUGE percentage of European bank debt needs to be rolled over by the end of 2012.

Between now (autumn 2011) and then (end of 2012)…

  • French banks need to roll over 30% of their TOTAL debt.
  • Spanish banks and Italian banks need to rollover more than 33% of their TOTAL debt.
  • German banks need to roll over nearly 40% of their TOTAL debt.
  • Irish banks need to roll over almost HALF (50%) of their TOTAL debt.

Let’s fast forward to today to focus on Spain’s current predicament:

Consider the following…

  1. Spain’s banking system is roughly €3 trillion in size (3X Spain’s GDP).
  2. Spanish banks’ gross borrowing from the ECB was €316 billion in April.
  3. Spanish banks need to roll over 20% of their bonds (roughly) €600 billion this year.

Anyone can see by this a simple “back of the envelope analysis “that Spain will need a lot more than €100 billion to recapitalize its banks.

How on earth Spanish banks can roll over €600 billion in bonds at a time when the global bond market has just learned that all private bondholders will be subordinate to the ESM is beyond me (read: it won’t happen).

And thanks to a €100 billion bailout which has put Spain’s REAL Debt to GDP at 146%, Spain is now facing both a banking crisis AND a sovereign crisis simultaneously. There is no entity on this planet that can shore up both the Spanish banking system as well as the Spanish Sovereign bond market.

To be blunt, I fully believe that this €100 billion bailout for Spain’s banks has put Spain in a “checkmate” position. With total unemployment at 25%, a housing bubble that continues to collapse, and an official Debt to GDP ratio of 146%, there is no way Spain will be able to grow its way out of this mess.

Put another way, Spain is a financial tsunami and the €100 billion is an emergency levy made of questionable materials built unqualified engineers: the move has bought some time, but the relief will be brief.

This is why Spain’s Credit Default Swaps (essentially bets that Spain will default) have nearly doubled in 2012 alone. And the bailout has done nothing to assuage investors’ beliefs that Spain is in BIG TROUBLE. Indeed, we’re heading back towards all time highs already within one week of the bailout.

Put another way, Spain is toast. I’ve already assessed that none of the key players (the IMF, the ECB, the EFSF, or the ESM) has the firepower to prop up Spain whose real capital needs are more in the ballpark of €300 billion -€500 billion.

Thus, it’s GAME OVER for the EU. Sure it may take a while for this to manifest as politicians offer various hair-brained schemes to attempt to put off the inevitable debt collapse, but that debt collapse is coming and it will hit before the end of 2012.

On that note, if you’re not preparing for the collapse of the EU, you need to do so now. I recently published a report showing investors how to prepare for this. It’s called How to Play the Collapse of the European Banking System and it explains exactly how the coming Crisis will unfold as well as which investments (both direct and backdoor) will profit from it.

This report is 100% FREE. You can pick up a copy today at:

Good Investing!

Graham Summers

PS. We also feature numerous other reports ALL devoted to helping you protect yourself, your portfolio, and your loved ones from the Second Round of the Great Crisis. Whether it’s a US Debt Default, runaway inflation, or even food shortages and bank holidays, our reports cover how to get through these situations safely and profitably.

And ALL of this is available for FREE under the OUR FREE REPORTS tab at:

Montag, 18. Juni 2012

Argentina's Next Nationalization Target: Spanish Gambling Companies

Argentina's Next Nationalization Target: Spanish Gambling Companies

Tyler Durden's picture

Following the nationalization of YPF several months ago, Argentina's recent anti-private industry overtures largely fell off the map. Until the last few days, when bondholders of Spanish gambling company Company have seen their holdings seemingly disappear in a big Greece vortex (modern parlance for infinite drain of wealth): the reason - bonds plunged on speculation the Argentina gaming industry may be next to go under sovereign control. From Bloomberg: "Bonds from Codere, the Spanish gambling company that depends on Argentina for more than half its earnings, are the world’s worst-performing euro-denominated notes on speculation President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner may seize the South American country’s gaming industry. Yields on the company’s 660 million euros of bonds due 2015 climbed 496 basis points last week to 18.97 percent. The performance was the worst among more than 2,000 securities tracked by BAML’s Euro High Yield and EMU Corporate indexes." The problem: should already highly leveraged Codere's Argentina operations be indeed nationalized, the bond will almost likely be Corzined, with recoveries which we expect will be comparable to those of Sino Forest.
From Bloomberg:
Codere’s notes tumbled after Argentina’s Clarin and Spain’s El Mundo newspapers reported that Fernandez may seize the gambling industry in a bid to generate new revenue sources as reserves tumble amid increasing capital flight. Argentina took a 51 percent stake in YPF from Spanish parent Repsol YPF in April, less than a month after Fernandez modified the central bank’s charter to allow unlimited use of international reserves to pay debt.

This would obviously destroy the company’s value,” said Robert Matz, an analyst at Covenant Review. “Bondholders really don’t have much recourse no matter what happens here. When a company gets nationalized, it’s not like the country is going to take on the debt. It would be a very ugly situation.”
Well they do: they can sell ahead of the event, which having learned from YPF, is precisely what they are now doing.
Press officials at Argentina’s presidential palace didn’t return a message seeking comment. Government officials haven’t addressed the speculation in public comments.

Codere’s bonds yielded 7.95 percent three months ago, before the YPF takeover. The government has said it will look into Repsol’s debts, disinvestments and environmental liabilities before determining any compensation for the seized shares.

“The bonds have collapsed, and people are worried,” said Chris Snow, an analyst at CreditSights. “In a nationalization, where you potentially put that asset value down to zero, that’s a much more adverse impact on the credit.”
Well, at 0, there surely will be far less value than at 67, where the bonds are trading now.
As such, going short here even with the negative carry, may not be the worst alpha-generating idea. Especially when the alternative is praying for central bank intervention, which works... if one has an infinite balance sheet.

Five Days Since The Spanish "Bailout": You Are Here

Five Days Since The Spanish "Bailout": You Are Here

Tyler Durden's picture

With few (if any) natural buyers of Spanish debt (especially given the lack of CDS-cash basis now), Spanish bonds continue to crumble lower in price and higher in yield/spread. For the first time ever, 10Y Spanish bond yields have passed 575bps over Bunds - currently trading at 7.15% yield. Since the post-banking-bailout open, Spanish bond spreads have soared a remarkable 114bps and whether this is seen as the fulcrum security or Italian bonds (which are also deteriorating rapidly this morning), it would appear that just as Spiegel reports today from the G-20, via a senior EU official: "If Germany Doesn't Make A Move, Europe Is Dead".
European sovereign bond spread movements post Spanish bailout

Charts: Bloomberg

Mittwoch, 13. Juni 2012

Spanish bank bailout] An ESM subordination… save?

Spanish bank bailout] An ESM subordination… save?

Hat-tip to Charles Forelle for pointing out a feature of ESM creditor status that we really should have noted earlier. From the Treaty:
In the event of ESM financial assistance in the form of ESM loans following a European financial assistance programme existing at the time of the signature of this Treaty, the ESM will enjoy the same seniority as all other loans and obligations of the beneficiary ESM Member, with the exception of the IMF loans.
In other words the ESM would be pari passu with bondholders, not preferred over them, if an applicant country already borrows from the EFSF.
You can see how this might be latched on to like a life-raft in the Spanish bank bailout, where fears of subordination are rife. There’s a good chance that Spain would access the EFSF temporarily in June or July. It will take time for states to ratify the ESM. So long as Spain borrows even a tiny bit from the EFSF, its subsequent ESM loans would not be senior, the theory might go.
Interestingly enough at pixel time, Reuters cited an EU official saying that Spain could take ESM loans later on, but these would not be senior. (Which would be news to this European Commission spokesperson cited by MNI, who confirmed that ESM loans would be senior. Could it possibly be that the authorities have no clue here?)
OK. But there is just one problem.
Signing a treaty does not mean the same thing as ratifying it.
Think how many treaties the United States has signed but not then ratified because of Congressional objections, for example.
The two are legally distinct because it is only on ratification (usually by a majority of signatories) that a treaty’s provisions enter into force for the states party to it. Signature can often take place years before ratification.
Throughout all this, incidentally, you have to remember the ESM will be an international organisation backed by treaty, not a Luxembourg private company like the EFSF.
The ESM Treaty section above refers only to signature. States signed the Treaty back in February 2012. At that time Portugal, Ireland and Greece were under financial assistance but not Spain, clearly.
This is either careless or very careful treaty drafting, depending on your point of view.
We suppose it’s entirely possible that eurozone officialdom could just ride roughshod over the signature point, given the problems which they must realise would ensue from subordination. Ultimately we’ll have to wait for the specific ESM loan terms.
But we’ll close by noting even ‘pari passu’ EFSF debt (or ESM debt which might subsequently absorb EFSF pari passu status) has shown signs of de facto seniority in Greece. EFSF loans to Greece were rescheduled before bondholders, but when it came to the PSI, the EFSF did not take write-downs in common with bondholders. Update: Oops! We should have known that until the second bailout, the EFSF didn’t lend to Greece. It received bilateral loans from eurozone states. These were pari passu in common with subsequent EFSF loans to Ireland and Portugal but it’s an important distinction. Thanks to a friend of FT Alphaville for pointing out our error.
Whatever happens, bondholders increasingly have to contend with subordination in eurozone bailouts now.

Montag, 11. Juni 2012

The Spanish Bailout Explained With One Image

The Spanish Bailout Explained With One Image

Tyler Durden's picture

Pretty much says it all.

Courtesy of Libertyblitzkrieg

3 1/2 %:Comunidad de Madrid:2008-15.7.15

3.5 Com Madrid 15 (SWX) - 15.07.2015  Price: 81 CHF Chg. (in%): +0.7 CHF (+0.87%) Volume: 500'000
3 1/2 %:Comunidad de Madrid:2008-15.7.15

Goldman On The Spanish Bond Subordination: "It's Only 13% Of Existing Spanish Debt"

Goldman On The Spanish Bond Subordination: "It's Only 13% Of Existing Spanish Debt"

Tyler Durden's picture

If anyone felt on the fence about the prospect of Spanish bond subordination by priming ESM loans, the following feeble attempt at justification by Goldman's Francesco Garzarelli, better known for shorting bonds into one of the biggest rip your face off rallies in TSY history, should really set their mind at ease. Or not.
Relative to the status quo, a net gain to existing government bondholders: Compared to a starting point where the Spanish government would have ultimately borne the credit risk from banks (via the FROB) without enjoying large access to market borrowing, the official sector loan represents a net gain for holders of Spanish government bonds, unless it changes incentives or leads to subordination. We consider both: 
  • Incentives: Relative to a situation where government bond funding was available almost entirely from the ECB, under no conditionality other than collateral rules (which have been progressively relaxed), Spain’s EMU peers now have more control over the restructuring process along the guidelines defined in 2011 (available here). In a statement, the Eurogroup indicates that progress on the pace of fiscal and structural reforms will continue to be monitored by the European Commission as for other countries under the excessive deficit procedure. As Andrew Benito argues in a separate note published June 10, Spain’s fiscal challenges remain high, but not insurmountable, in our view. To the extent that the stable funding allays fears of deposit flight, and releases pressures on sovereign funding and hence on the interest bill, the official sector aid should increase the odds of a more orderly Spanish deleveraging.  
  • Subordination: The issue of subordination of government bonds remains a central one for investors. De iure, EFSF loans are pari passu with existing bonds. Concerns have been expressed as to whether de facto the official sector is now a senior creditor. This is always a possibility (as we have seen with discussions over the credit status of the ECB). However, it is also important to note that the EUR 100bn (which are unlikely, on our estimates, to be fully used) represents 13% of the existing Spanish public debt, about 10% of 2011 GDP.
Oh, it is ONLY 13% of outstanding Spanish debt. That's perfectly ok then. Oh wait, most priming DIPs for bankrupt companies tend to be somewhere in the 10-40% of total pre-petition debt too. Sadly however, the mere assumption that €100 billion in senior debt will be sufficient to plug the hole in Spanish banks, which rose from €40 billion to €100 billion in under one week, is laughable. And of course, every incremental dollar of senior debt means less value to existing subordinate Spanish bonds.
Finally, confirming that one should get the hell out of Dodge, is the fact that Goldman now is telling its clients to, wait for it, buy Spanish bonds.
Short-dated Spanish Government Bonds Offer Value

Whilst no ‘paradigm shift’ for the way the EMU sovereign and banking crisis is being tackled, relative to where things stood last Friday (June 8) the decision by Spain to seek financial assistance is a marginal positive. Conditionality is limited to the banking sector and we think the larger size of the loan should help foster confidence that there will be sufficient resources to recapitalize banks and to face quite adverse scenarios.

The amount seems to reflect the IMF assessment published on June 8 that “it is better to overestimate than underestimate” a backstop for capital shortfalls. The IMF estimates that while the largest banks would be sufficiently recapitalized, several others would need EUR40bn to comply with the Basel III transition schedule (Core Tier 1 capital of 7%) and a larger amount to include restructuring costs and reclassification of loans that will be identified by the independent evaluations. The IMF will host a conference call on Monday to discuss its top-down assessment.

Even though the statistics for public debt will increase by about 10% of GDP, the funding program of the Spanish government will not be affected and the loan will come at much more advantageous terms for the public sector than current market rates. The combination of these two factors should reduce pressure on the Spanish sovereign. All else equal, yields should decline, particularly at the front-end of the curve. On Friday, the 3-year benchmark bonds closed at around 480bp over Germany. We could see a rally towards a 400bp spread during the volatile period while more news on the transaction becomes available. A more sustained compression requires a reduction of systemic fears surrounding the EMU project, in our view. Any indications of long-run solutions coming out of meetings taking place this month could be supportive in this direction as argued by the President of the ECB in his last press conference (See Global Markets Daily, Euro Vision).
Yes, we have seen this one so many, many times before: if Goldman is telling its clients  to buy, it means Goldman is....
fill in the blank.

Sonntag, 10. Juni 2012

Never Forget Article 9 of EU 593/2008. Enter PSI. // Andreas Koutras // Ultimately, though we should not have illusions. A restructuring of Spanish bank and/ Spanish government debt would happen. It just takes time to prepare for it.

Never Forget Article 9 of EU 593/2008. Enter PSI. // Andreas Koutras // Ultimately, though we should not have illusions. A restructuring of Spanish bank and/ Spanish government debt would happen. It just takes time to prepare for it.

The Spanish Position
Andreas Koutras, 11 June 2012
Holding the bull by its horns or castrating the bull?
Over the weekend, the ECOFIN/EUROGROUP decided to throw around 100billion of good money after bad. The 100billion is the initial maximum amount that has been allocated. It would be given to FROB, the Spanish bank restructuring vehicle. We do not know as yet the conditionality or the terms imposed by Europe. One can assume that there would be some conditions albeit not as stringent as one might think. This is not a state bailout like in Greece and Ireland but a bank handout. The Spanish government did not want to be completely humiliated and asked for bank money. But do not forget, this is how the crisis in Ireland started. First Mr Trichet of the ECB pushed the Irish government to guarantee the insolvent banks and then the whole country was pushed into Troika hands.
The 100billion also signal the demise of the EFSF. Taking Spain out of the pool would reduce the available cash for further bailouts to a trickle. The rest can cover possibly only Cyprus. So long EFSF. EFSF’s replacement the ESM is not yet activated or ratified.
I say initial 100billion because the new Spanish Dynasty serial has more episodes to come. The “Spanish recap estimates” remind me a bit of the “Greek statistics”. Every revision pushes the amount up. Now the IMF is estimating around 40billion and many market analysts put this number to 100, hence the ECOFIN number.
The question is why if it is only 40billion as estimated by the Spanish government and the IMF the Kingdom did not raise this cash on its own. After all it is not a huge amount of money. It is only 4% of the GDP and FROB could have issued the bonds under their guarantee and give them to Spanish banks which in turn would hand them over to the 3Y LTRO. Apparently, the ECB objected to this solution. Of course it is also a question of cost. The EFSF money is cheaper than the current funding rates of the Kingdom.
Are the 100billion going to be enough? Let me drop some numbers from the end of 2010 report of “Associacion Hipotecaria Espanola”. Remember the Spanish GDP is roughly 1050billion.
 Total outstanding non-financial lending of 1652billion.
o Total residential and commercial real estate lending 1,100Billion. Out of this 673billion are residential lending and 427billion are Commercial Real estate, construction and development.
 Lending for pure construction totals of 112billion
The current numbers of outstanding debt are probably somewhat better but the Spanish economy is not powering ahead either. So, the 40billion looks like an underestimate. The 100billion plus some more from the next few years looks more realistic. Unless of course the Spanish economy turns really belly up in which case a lot more would be needed.
So welcome to the second official subordination of Spanish debt. The first one is already under way as the ECB considers the SMP holdings as a sacred monetary policy cow. Presumably the 100billion would be added to the Spanish taxpayer’s bill and would push the government debt even higher. The next episodes may involve some kind of PSI restructuring. An overview of the process can be found in PSI lessons to Investors. Whether it is going to be a “maturity extension”, a haircut, or bond swap, Greece has proved that the tool is there and ready to be used. It is called Article 9 of EU 593/2008 (more later).
FROB (Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria)
The Spanish restructuring vehicle FROB has capital of 15billion and guarantees of 47billion by the Kingdom of Spain. FROB issues debt under the unconditional guarantee of the Kingdom. So far 43 savings banks out of 45 have taken part in the FROB exercise and only 4 have been found non-viable. Most of others were merged. Three banks needed capital injection of 4.7billion. In all cases FROB issued common shares, with a time horizon of 3years.
Will the new recap be with common or preferential shares as before? Will there be any closures or mergers? Restructuring the Caixas may be a good warm up game but the big banks is like playing in a Champions League. Europe has done this exercise before in Ireland. And it was a shameful exercise. Holders of senior bank debt were saved and taxpayers and pensioners left to foot the bill. If they do the same in Spain as they did in Ireland then Europe risks arming a much bigger bomb than they diffuse. Apart from the moral hazard that it creates and perpetuates, Europe would be alienating the people of a much bigger and more economically significant country.
The situation is not at all similar to that of Greece. In Greece, banks were the victims of lending money to the government as any loyal local lender does or is expected to do. Their main cause of failure was not bad loans (they have them but not the main cause). In Spain as in Ireland and Portugal local lenders engaged in bad loan practices. The bubble in the real estate/construction sector was obvious for everyone to see. On average, in a developed economy, construction accounts for around 4% of the GDP. In Spain and Ireland it was close to 12%. Policy makers were either incompetent or willing collaborators in this bubble. The Irish developer-politician-banker links are well documented for example.
In Greece if you are holding senior bank debt you are safer than holding a Government promise to repay you. This is because the ECB refuses to let any bank go bust while EUROGROUP is happy to let a country go bankrupt. Would this be repeated in Spain? I do not know but my guess is that, better to place bets with the central bank than with any European politician.
Recent historical lessons from Greece
Last week a rare event happened. Despite hints that Greece may blow up Europe, the World and the Universe it was Spain that captured the destructive imagination of the markets and policy makers. Is Spain experiencing a Greek May 2010 event and if yes what could be the differences and similarities on the way ahead. If you remember in May 2010 Greece activated the newly formed bailout mechanism. At the time, as it is the case now with Spain, Europe’s politicians were deluding themselves that an injection of new good money after bad would do the trick. The ECB insisted that banks should be saved at all costs and that no failure is allowed (see Ireland). But let’s take a step and look at the path to oblivion.
Downgrading a European Country
Once upon a time all Eurozone members were also members of the investment grade club, whether they deserved it or not. The ECB had a rule that said as long as a government bond was rated at BBB+ and above it was accepted as collateral for Eurosystem transactions. i.e. Repo funding. The rule still stands but with exceptions. If a country like Greece goes below the threshold, then the rule is amended to accept that country’s collateral. What kind of a rule is a rule that when broken, it is not enforced but amended? Only the ECB can answer this.
The issue however, is not so much the ECB but market practice. Most funds, whether pension funds or other bond and investment funds have internal rules that are much harder to break than those of the ECB. Here is the problem. The great majority of institutional bond buyers are only allowed to buy and hold investment grade bonds. When the credit rating of a country approaches the edge of the investment grade, most investment managers would start selling. Having to go to your investment committee and ask for an exception is politically (internal) much harsher than monetizing a small loss.
Path to oblivion
So, there is a clear dichotomy in the bond market. If the market for investment grade securities is 5trillion (say) the junk market is a small fraction of it. This is especially so in European Government Bonds (EGB). Thus there is a huge amount of sellers and only a handful of natural buyers. When there are more sellers than buyers, common wisdom tells us that prices fall.
1. So the first step is to get rid of the bond that breaches or is on a path to breach your internal investment rules (near junk rating or BBB).
a. As there are more sellers than natural buyers in the junk rating section prices fall. Politicians who do not have a clue about how the markets work or want to have a cheap shot at it claim that the “bad” speculators and derivatives are driving the country down. There are calls for CDS to be outlawed and for short selling to be banned.
2. Quantitative boffins calculate the probability of default based on the price action and publish their finding in major newswires.
3. The new probabilities scare investors who do not understand how erroneous and misleading these calculations are and sell even more (For those interested click Greek Default Probabilities)
4. Rating agencies need to respond. Otherwise they would be accused of being behind the curve. They respond to this by downgrading even more the country in question after making the same probabilistic calculation as in step 4.
5. Now go back to step 1.
Of course in between these steps we have the reaction of the ECB and the financial institutions of the country in peril. Here are the steps:
1. ECB announces that no matter how low the rating is as long as it has not defaulted it would continue to accept the bonds as collateral.
2. Concurrently either the ECB or the banks of that country or both engage in supporting the market by buying up everything that is dumped by non-local investors.
3. All this buying is reducing the available liquidity of the bonds in question in the real market. The ECB does not re-hypothecate the bonds and this means that the free stock is reduced. The country’s banks can now only repo and fund these bonds with the ECB reducing the availability of collateral even further. As the rating of the banks falls it becomes increasingly difficult to offer these bonds for repo with Euroclear.
4. The end result is that liquidity is reduced, bid-offer spreads widen as market makers lose access to bonds, and prices fall further.
5. In other words the action of the ECB is like the kiss of death for liquidity. But this is not the whole story. Now we have “official” holders of debt (ECB, bilateral loans) that totally refuse to be restructured. In other words they create a new species of investor. The preferential investor. Some claim that this a blatant disregard of market practice and the law. Notice the irrationality? It is not the bond or the loan that has preference over other bonds (like Senior and Subordinated). We are now taking into account the reasons an investor bought the bonds for. It’s like this. You buy tickets for a concert and the concert is cancelled. All tickets are the same and Pari Passu. However, the organisers decide to reimburse only a specific class of ticketholders (say corporate ticket buyers) by giving them new tickets for another concert.

Never Forget Article 9 of EU 593/2008. Enter PSI.
So you end up with a great majority of the bonds owned either by the official sector or by the local banks. Here is where the fun starts. Politicians who up to now refused default and restructuring are beginning to see the merits of forcefully reducing the debt load. Here is how it can happen:
1. All of a sudden the government realises that the great majority of government debt is under local law and guess what. They are the law! They can change it with a simple parliamentary act.
2. Most of the debt is now owned by local banks who would be bribed to take part in the restructuring since recapitalisation is promised.
3. Next they need a good marketing strategy to make it look as if they are doing it for the benefit of the people.
4. As many of the bonds are owned by friends and family (Official sector and local banks) they devise a strategy to compensate them for their losses. The official sector would be immunised and all the debt would be passed from tradable bonds to loans to the EFSF/ESM.
5. Next come Article 9 of EU 593/2008. This allows any European country to suspend contractual law and change the terms of a contract (Bond, Loan etc) unilaterally claiming the public interest (and Mandatory provisions). For those who still don’t get it, a European sovereign has the right to change a bond’s terms (if it is under local law) and the rest of Europe or investors can do very little about it. This is how the Greek PSI was done and this is most probably how the next restructuring is going to be done. BTW, do not blame the Greeks for this. It was not their idea.
Moral of the story. Buy international English law periphery bonds if you must. Otherwise invest in EGB at your peril. Owning senior debt in a European BCCI (Bank of Crooks and Criminals) is probably safer than owing a politically volatile government debt.
The first 100billion to save Spanish banks is a repeat of the Greek game of buying some time before a more concrete and possibly harsher solution is concocted by politicians. Ultimately, though we should not have illusions. A restructuring of Spanish bank and/ Spanish government debt would happen. It just takes time to prepare for it.

Rajoy To de Guindos: "Spain Is Not Uganda"

Rajoy To de Guindos: "Spain Is Not Uganda"

Tyler Durden's picture

Yesterday, following the Spanish bailout, we finally concluded that contrary to endless politician lies, Spain is Greece. However, in keeping with the insolvent Eurozone's favorite Hegelian dialectic of definition by exclusion, it appears that Spain's leaders have been forced to aim lower. Literally. As in all the way in Africa. Because according to El Mundo's front page article, the text message that PM Rajoy sent from somewhere deep in Euro2012 to de Guindos, is essentially this: "España no es Uganda." This needs no translation. It also means that the people of Uganda should be happy. Very happy.

Obviously this move should not come as a surprise to anyone. Recall that it was two weeks ago that Nigeria decided to cut its European exposure. Last we checked, it still held on to Ugandan risk.
Sadly, not even The Onion could have come up with a story quite as David Lynchian.

Samstag, 9. Juni 2012

Grünes Licht: Spanien bekommt europäische Banken-Hilfe

Grünes Licht: Spanien bekommt europäische Banken-Hilfe

Spanien wird Milliardenhilfen aus dem Euro-Rettungsfonds beantragen - das bestätigte Wirtschaftsminister Luis de Guindos am Samstagabend. Eurogruppenchef Jean-Claude Juncker gab umgehend Grünes Licht.
Madrid/BrüsselSpanien wird seine europäischen Partner um Milliardenhilfen zur Sanierung seines angeschlagenen Bankensystems bitten. Das sagte der spanische Wirtschaftsminister Luis de Guindos am Samstagabend in Madrid. Zuvor hatten die Finanzminister der Eurozone rund drei Stunden in einer kurzfristig angesetzten Telefonkonferenz über die Bankenkrise Spaniens beraten.

Die Euro-Länder zeigten sich umgehend bereit, Spanien bei der Stützung seines Bankensektors mit etwa 100 Milliarden Euro zu unterstützen. „Die Eurogruppe ist informiert worden, dass die spanische Regierung bald einen offiziellen Antrag stellen wird und ist bereit, auf einen solchen Antrag positiv zu antworten“, hieß es in einer am Samstag veröffentlichten Erklärung von Eurogruppenchef Jean-Claude Juncker. Der Betrag solle den Kapitalbedarf sowie einen Sicherheitspuffer beinhalten und werde auf „bis zu 100 Milliarden Euro“ insgesamt geschätzt.
Der Rettungsfonds EFSF kann Staaten auch Notkredite gewähren, um taumelnden großen Banken zu helfen. Bei solch einer „weichen Rettung“ würde das Geld ausschließlich für den Finanzsektor eingesetzt. Entsprechend sind die Auflagen niedriger als bei Hilfsgeldern für den Staatshaushalt als Ganzes. So müsste Spanien den Bankensektor reformieren und für die betroffenen Banken Sanierungspläne erstellen.
Nach Vorlage eines Antrags muss zunächst die EU-Kommission mit der Europäischen Zentralbank und der EU-Finanzaufsicht prüfen, ob die Voraussetzungen für EFSF-Kredite an Spanien zur Bankenrekapitalisierung vorliegen. Erst danach kann die Eurogruppe die Hilfe billigen.
Aus dem EFSF erhalten bereits die drei Länder Portugal, Irland und Griechenland Nothilfen für den Haushalt als Ganzes. Sie müssen dafür weitreichende Reform- und Sparauflagen - nicht nur in der Bankenbranche - einhalten.
Das klamme Spanien kann sich derzeit nur zu recht hohen Zinsen Geld an den Finanzmärkten leihen. Bisher wollte es seine kriselnde Bankenbranche ohne Hilfe von außen sanieren. Spaniens Bankenbranche leidet unter der Immobilienkrise: Viele Banken sitzen auf faulen Krediten, die wohl nicht zurückgezahlt werden.
Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) hat Spaniens Ankündigung begrüßt. Schäuble würdigte in einer Erklärung am Samstagabend „die Entschlossenheit der spanischen Regierung“, die Sanierung des Bankensektors anzugehen und dabei auf Mittel aus dem Euro-Rettungsfonds zurückzugreifen. Anders als ein Teil des Finanzsektors sei „Spanien als Ganzes“ dank eingeleiteter Reformen „auf einem guten Weg“. Deutschland, wie auch die anderen Länder und Institutionen der Eurozone würde das Land bei der Sanierung des Bankensektors unterstützen.

Donnerstag, 7. Juni 2012

AnleiheauktionSpanien muss Investoren höhere Renditen bieten

AnleiheauktionSpanien muss Investoren höhere Renditen bieten

Spanien hat den Kapitalmarkt erfolgreich um Geld angezapft, muss Investoren aber mit deutlich steigender Rendite locken. Die Emission verlief besser als erwartet, Entspannung ist aber nicht in Sicht.

Ein spanischer Stierkämpfer: An den Märkten hat Spanien einen weiteren Kampf für sich entschieden. Quelle: dapd
Ein spanischer Stierkämpfer: An den Märkten hat Spanien einen weiteren Kampf für sich entschieden. Quelle: dapd
Für Spanien ist am Anleihemarkt keine Entspannung in Sicht. Das Land hat zwar keine Probleme, frisches Geld zu bekommen, muss aber immer höhere Zinsen zahlen. Das hochverschuldete Land sammelte am Donnerstag rund 2,1 Milliarden Euro ein und damit etwas mehr als die angepeilten ein bis zwei Milliarden Euro. Die durchschnittliche Rendite für zehnjährige Anleihen stieg jedoch auf 6,044 Prozent nach zuletzt 5,743 Prozent. Auch die Renditen für Papiere mit einer Laufzeit bis 2014 und 2016 kletterten um rund einen Prozentpunkt im Vergleich zu früheren Emissionen. Die Nachfrage der Investoren überstieg das Angebot deutlich. Die Auktion der zehnjährigen Papiere war 3,3-fach (zuvor 2,4-fach) überzeichnet.

Dienstag, 5. Juni 2012

Euro-KriseSpanien: „Die Tür zum Markt ist zu“

Euro-KriseSpanien: „Die Tür zum Markt ist zu“

Nun gesteht auch Finanzminister Montoro offen ein, dass Spanien faktisch von den Finanzmärkten abgeschnitten ist. Das treibt die Spekulation über eine weitere Eskalation der Krise an - und setzt G7 sowie EZB unter Druck.

Der spanische Finanzminister Cristobal Montoro. Quelle: Reuters
Der spanische Finanzminister Cristobal Montoro. Quelle: Reuters
Madrid/BerlinSpanien hat offen Probleme bei der Refinanzierung über die Finanzmärkte eingeräumt und so die Spekulation über eine weitere Eskalation der Krise angeheizt. Die Märkte seien zu den derzeitigen Zinsen de facto für Spanien nicht mehr zugänglich, sagte Finanzminister Cristobal Montoro dem Radiosender Onda Cero. Dieses Eingeständnis drückte den Euro und sorgte für neue Verluste an den Aktienmärkten.
 Finanzprofis setzten ihre Hoffnungen auf neue Schritte der führenden Industrieländer G7 und der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB). Die G7 wollten Kreisen zufolge in einer Telefonkonferenz zur Krise ihr weiteres Vorgehen abstimmen. Teilnehmen sollten nach Angaben Kanadas Finanzminister und führende Zentralbankvertreter aus den USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Japan und Kanada. Die EZB berät am Mittwoch über die Geldpolitik in der Euro-Zone. In der Gruppe der 20 führenden Industrie- und Schwellenländer (G20) gibt es Bestrebungen, Deutschland und andere finanzstarke Länder zu mehr Wachstumsimpulsen zu bewegen, wie die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters erfuhr.

Sonntag, 3. Juni 2012

Refinancing needs of Spanish regions in 2012

Refinancing needs of Spanish regions in 2012
Spanish region
Refinancing needs in 2012

Castilla-La Mancha€2,336.96m
La Rioja€1,970.48m
Castilla Leon€549.27m
Basque Country€216.20m
Source: Reuters
Showing 1 to 18 of 18 entries

Kataloniens Präsident Artur Mas: Em sap greu (Tut mir leid/Katalanisch) - wir haben kein Geld mehr. (Foto: Flickr/agenciaacn)

15 Milliarden Euro fehlen: Katalonien kann seine Rechnungen nicht mehr bezahlen

Katalonien ist von der Insolvenz bedroht. Nun hat Spaniens reichste autonome Region die Regierung um Finanzhilfe gebeten. Und die spanische Bankia spricht nun von benötigten 20 Milliarden Euro
Kataloniens Präsident Artur Mas: Em sap greu (Tut mir leid/Katalanisch) - wir haben kein Geld mehr. (Foto: Flickr/agenciaacn)
Kataloniens Präsident Artur Mas: Em sap greu (Tut mir leid/Katalanisch) - wir haben kein Geld mehr. (Foto: Flickr/agenciaacn)
Spaniens hochverschuldete Regionen treiben das spanische Defizit in die Höhe und weigern sich seit Wochen, ihre eigenen Ausgaben zu kürzen und die Reformen der Zentralregierung mitzutragen. Nun bereitet ausgerechnet Katalonien, Spaniens reichste autonome Region, der Regierung in Madrid zusätzliche Sorgen. Die Region braucht dringend eine Finanzspritze.
13 Milliarden Euro benötigt die Region Katalonien kurzfristig (Grafik: Reuters)
13 Milliarden Euro benötigt die Region Katalonien kurzfristig (Grafik: Reuters)
Artur Mas, Kataloniens Präsident, richtete sich am Freitag direkt an die zentrale Regierung Spaniens. „Uns ist es egal, wie sie es tun, aber wir müssen Zahlungen tätigen am Monatsende”, sagte er. „Unsere Wirtschaft kann sich nicht erholen, wenn wir unsere Rechnungen nicht begleichen können.“ Katalonien erwirtschaftet jährlich ein Fünftel des spanischen BIP. Nun gehen der Region die Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten aus. Allein in diesem Jahr müssen allein 13 Milliarden Euro refinanziert werden. Allein die Zinszahlungen Kataloniens haben sich in den vergangenen zwei Jahren auf 2 Milliarden Euro verdoppelt.
Darüber hinaus hat sich auch der Finanzierungsbedarf der spanischen Bankia erhöht. War am Freitagvormittag noch von einer Finanzlücke in Höhe von 15 Milliarden Euro die Rede, sollen es nun sogar 20 Milliarden Euro sein.
Die Finanzmärkte reagierten entsprechend, der Euro sank auf unter 1,25 Dollar – ein 2-Jahres-Tief. Und auch der Dax rutschte vorübergehend ins Minus. „Dies schürt die Furcht vor einer Eskalation der Schuldenkrise“, sagte ein Börsianer der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters.
Der Dax rutschte aufgrund der schlechten Nachrichten aus Spanien vorübergehend ins Minus (Grafk: Bloomberg)
Der Dax rutschte aufgrund der schlechten Nachrichten aus Spanien vorübergehend ins Minus (Grafk: Bloomberg)

Fitch stuft acht spanische Regionen herab // Katalonien, das erst vergangene Woche die spanische Regierung aufforderte, den Finanzierungsbedarf der Region zu decken (hier), wurde beispielsweise mit BBB- bewertet

Krise spitzt sich zu: Fitch stuft acht spanische Regionen herab

Die Ratingagentur Fitch hat acht spanische, auotonome Regionen herabgestuft. Der Ausblick sei negativ, weil in den Regionen kaum relevante Sparanstrengungen unternommen würden.
Die Unsicherheit in Spanien nimmt zu: Der hohe Kapitalbedarf der spanischen Bankia, der angeschlagene nationale Bankensektor, die hohe Verschuldung des Landes und der Regionen sowie die stetig steigenden Zinssätze für spanische Anleihen schüren die Angst der Spanier. Mit einer beispiellosen Geschwindigkeit versuchen die Bürger und Unternehmen des Landes, ihr Geld aus Spanien ins Ausland zu bringen.
Im März verließen 66,2 Milliarden Euro das Land, so die spanische Zentralbank. Das ist der höchste Betrag seit Aufzeichnungsbeginn 1990, so El Pais. Und es ist auch doppelt so viel wie noch im Monat zuvor. In den vergangenen neun Monaten haben 193 Milliarden Euro das Land verlassen (mehr hier).
Zudem hat die Ratingagentur Fitch am Donnerstag acht autonome Regionen in Spanien herabgestuft. Die Kreditwürdigkeit für das Baskenland aber auch Andalusien, Asturien, Madrid, Kantabrien, Murcia, die Kanarischen Inseln und Katalonien wurde gesenkt. Katalonien, das erst vergangene Woche die spanische Regierung aufforderte, den Finanzierungsbedarf der Region zu decken (hier), wurde beispielsweise mit BBB- bewertet – eine Stufe über „Ramsch“-Niveau. Der Ausblick für alle acht Regionen ist negativ.


Name ^V WKN ^V Börse
Handelsvolumen (Stk.)
02.06.2012 06:20
95,50 %
02.06.2012 06:20
100,86 %
01.06.2012 13:08
98,70 %
01.06.2012 13:08
73,49 %
01.06.2012 13:08
84,72 %
15.11.2011 16:04
96,02 %
01.06.2012 08:12
92,43 %
15.09.2011 22:36
101,59 %
09.05.2012 10:13
95,57 %
10.02.2012 10:23
99,14 %
01.06.2012 17:25
99,00 %
22.02.2011 22:00
98,25 %
01.06.2012 08:08
95,76 %
01.06.2012 17:29
96,40 %
05.12.2011 14:46
100,06 %
02.06.2012 06:20
100,02 %
02.06.2012 06:21
98,42 %
01.06.2012 17:55
96,76 %
02.06.2012 06:21
84,39 %
02.06.2012 06:20
84,39 %